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ABSTRACT
We show how the so-called distributional characteristic of a policy instrument can be
additively decomposed into two components; one that captures the targeting efficiency of the
instrument, the other its redistributive efficiency. Using these measures, we provide an
interpretation of the commonly used leakage and undercoverage rates (and other indices
based on these concepts) within standard welfare theory. Essentially, one can interpret such
indices as special (and restrictive) cases of the targeting efficiency index. As well as failing to
capture the relative redistributive efficiencies of policy instruments, they also implicitly assume a
set of value judgments consistent only with the commonly used poverty gap. For illustrative
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  Examples include the PROGRESA program in Mexico, the PRAF program in Honduras, and programs
1
under consideration in a number of other Latin American countries. All these programs have a poverty-
alleviation cash transfer component, and all are in part motivated by the desire to move to better-targeted policy
instruments.
1.  INTRODUCTION
In response to a tightening of government finances in the wake of structural adjustment
reforms and other budgetary “shocks” in developing countries, the desire to design more
efficient poverty-alleviation (or transfer) programs has become central to the policy debate. In
terms of policy choices, there has been a movement toward policy instruments that “target” the
budget more efficiently to the “target group,” e.g., the poor.  A common approach to evaluating
1
the relative efficiency of alternative programs has been to compare leakage and
undercoverage rates (Baker and Grosh 1994), or the closely related concepts of E-mistakes
and F-mistakes (Cornia and Stewart 1995), as well as ROC curves (Wodon 1997). While
such indicators capture some aspects of the welfare impacts from better targeting, they also
have obvious shortcomings. For example, the undercoverage (U) and leakages (L) approach
focus on the identity of the recipients, i.e., poor or nonpoor, ignoring the size and distribution of
the budget.
This paper has four objectives. After this introduction, Section 2 sets out a simple general
equilibrium model for the evaluation of alternative transfer programs (or policy instruments).
Using this model, we derive the total welfare impact for a range of policy instruments as the sum
of the direct effect on welfare plus the indirect welfare effect arising from the need to restore2
equilibrium in product and factor markets as well as to public finances. Most analyses of the
distributional impact of programs focus on the direct impact on welfare, and in this paper we
are concerned exclusively with this component. Section 3 derives the so-called distributional
characteristic of a policy instrument as the welfare-weighted sum of transfers across
households divided by the unweighted sum of transfers, i.e., the transfer budget. We show how
one can additively decompose this statistic into two terms, one that captures the targeting
efficiency of the instrument, the other its redistributive efficiency. Section 4 uses this
decomposition to provide an interpretation of the conventional leakage and undercoverage
rates. Essentially, these can be seen as special (and restrictive) cases of the targeting efficiency
index. Finally, for purely illustrative purposes, Section 5 presents an empirical application of the
decomposition using Mexican data, showing that the welfare gains associated with moving
away from universal subsidies arise mainly from improved targeting—as opposed to
redistributive—efficiency. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions.
2. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
In this section we set out a simple general equilibrium model that helps to highlight the
important ingredients in any welfare evaluation of alternative policy instruments. The model
presented draws heavily on the work of Drèze and Stern (1987), which in turn owes much to
Guesnerie (1979).3
  See Coady and Harris (2000) for a more formal discussion and for calculations for Mexico.
2
  We are obviously treating the household as the relevant unit for welfare analysis. This formulation
3
ignores a number of important policy issues related to the intrahousehold allocation of resources, e.g., the
response of households to the transfer of resources to individual members (children, females). 
The impact of any policy instrument (e.g., the introduction, or change in the level, of a tax
or cash transfer) on social welfare can be separated into its direct impact on welfare and its
indirect impact arising from the need to restore equilibrium in product and factor markets as
well as in government finances. The policy instrument leads to changes in demand that, in
general, must be met by reallocating scarce resources between competing activities. If all
markets are perfectly competitive and the government has access to optimal lump-sum
transfers, then aggregate indirect effects are zero because on the margin the benefits from
reallocation equal the costs (i.e., marginal benefits are set equal to marginal costs throughout the
economy and these also coincide with social costs and benefits). Where income distribution is
sub-optimal, any indirect welfare effects arise solely from the redistribution of income. In the
absence of perfect markets or where there are government-induced tax distortions, additional
indirect welfare effects, due to the “reallocation” of resources and the “deadweight loss” from
taxes, are also present. In general, such indirect effects can constitute a substantial proportion
of the direct effects, even for marginal reforms.
2
Consider an economy with three sets of agents: households, firms, and the government.
Households are assumed to maximize utility that is a function of consumption levels, subject to a
budget constraint that ensures that incomes equal expenditures.  In addition, households may
34
  Throughout, bold type indicates a vector.
4
face quantity constraints, e.g., subsidized rationing of some commodities. Household behavior
can then be completely captured by an indirect utility function, V(q,q ,m,0 0), where q is a vector s
of prices faced by the consumer (including the price of labor), q  is a vector of subsidized ration s
prices, m is household lump-sum income, and0 0 is a vector of commodity rations.  The budget
4
constraint for each household (denoted by h superscript) is then given by q.x = m where m is
lump-sum (nonlabor) incomes defined for each household as
m  / r  + (q - q ).0 0  ,
h    h        h
s
where r  is a cash transfer by the government to household h and 0 0  is a vector of commodity
h                        h
ration levels facing the household that it receives at a subsidized price, q  < q. Firms are s
assumed to operate under constant returns to scale so that supply is demand determined and
profits are zero. The government’s budget constraint is given by
R / t.x - ’  r  - (q - q ).0 0 , h          s
h
where t is a vector of taxes on commodities consumed and factors supplied by households,
with t = q - p and p being a vector of producer prices. Since producer prices are assumed
fixed, we have dq = dt.
The problem the “social planner” then faces is to redistribute resources using the most
efficient policy instruments from among a set that includes commodity taxes or subsidies, ration
levels and prices, and cash transfers. The constraints facing the planner are the market
equilibrium constraints that demand must equal supply as well as the government budget￿(s;T T) / W(...,V
h(s;T T),...) % 8 R ,
5
  This implicitly assumes that the only distortions in the economy are government induced. Where
5
other market imperfections exist one needs to focus on “shadow revenue” which captures income effects
accruing outside the government budget. See Drèze and Stern (1987) for detailed discussion.
(1)
constraint. As shown in Drèze and Stern (1987), using Walras’ law, the planner’s problem may
be rewritten as
where s is a vector of policy instruments that are completely controlled by the planner and are
chosen optimally, T T is a vector of policy instruments that are outside the planner’s complete
control and which include the policy instruments highlighted above, and 8 is the Lagrange
multiplier on the government budget constraint (i.e., the marginal social—or shadow—value of
government revenue). As before, V (.) is the indirect utility function for h, and W(.) is a
h
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. This formulation of the problem has the attraction
of presenting the problem in terms of the standard trade-off between consumer welfare and
government revenue. The impact of any “policy reform” on W(.) captures the direct welfare
impact of the reform, while the impact on revenue captures the indirect welfare impacts.
5
The policy reforms under consideration are assumed to include a change in the tax
(subsidy) on commodity i, a change in the quantity or price of a rationed commodity, or an
introduction of a cash-transfer program. All can be viewed as part of the exogenous policy
parameters, T T. The welfare impact of each policy reform can be seen by differentiating (1)
w.r.t. each of the policy instruments (i.e., m , t, q , and 0 0) to get
h
i   si     iM￿
MT T
dT T / MW
MT T





dm ’ jh $
h dm





  This derivation makes use of the fact that the welfare impacts of changes in s in response to changes
6
in T T can, by the envelope theorem, be ignored.
(2)
(3)
where the first term on the right-hand side captures the direct welfare effects and the second
term, the indirect welfare effects.  Below we consider each policy reform in turn.
6
We first consider a (marginal) change in government transfers to households,
dm / {dm }. Differentiating (1) w.r.t. m we get
h
where $  / (MW/MV )(MV /Mm ) is the marginal social valuation of income to h (or its “welfare
h    h h h
weight”). This welfare weight is higher for the more “deserving,” e.g., the poor, and so the
social value depends on the distribution of the transfers across households.  8 is the social cost
of the revenue used to finance the transfer (i.e., the so-called cost of public funds), and the last
term in brackets on the right-hand side captures the indirect revenue effects as demands change
in response to the transfer. If households receiving the transfers have a high propensity to buy
relatively highly taxed commodities, then this will reduce the net impact on the government
budget and thus decrease the social cost of the transfer.
Now consider a change in the tax of commodity i, e.g., food. If all households are net
consumers of i, then redistributing income will usually involve reducing t (or increasing the iM￿
Mti
dti ’ & jh $
h x
h
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h 0
h
i dqis % 8 (jh 0
h






subsidy, in which case t is negative). Using the standard properties of the indirect utility i
function, the welfare impact of a tax change is then
The first term indicates that households gain from the reform according to the level of their
existing consumption; the existing level of demand gives a measure of this welfare effect in
money terms. The direct impact on social welfare is greater the more poor households consume
the good. Again, the social cost of the transfer using a commodity tax is lower if households
respond to the price change by switching demand away from (toward) relatively highly
subsidized (taxed) commodities. 
The impact of a change in the subsidy on rationed commodities is got by differentiating
(1) w.r.t. q  to get is
The extent to which households lose depends on the level of the ration quantities they receive.
Also, the government receives budget gains as the subsidy bill decreases, these gains being
offset if households decrease their consumption of relatively heavily taxed commodities.




h (qi & qis) d0i & 8 (qi & qis)(h




  On this, and related issues, see Dixit (1975), Drèze and Stern (1987) and Coady and Drèze (2000).
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(6)
where h  indicates the number of households who receive the extra rations. Households gain by
*
the extent of the subsidy (i.e., they switch from more expensive market purchases when they
get the extra ration) with the social value of the change increasing the more effectively the
rations are targeted at poor households. This essentially assumes that rations are infra-marginal
or that resale is possible. But the government has to finance the extra subsidized consumption
(although it receives extra revenue to offset this if households increase their consumption of
taxed commodities). Where the commodity cannot be purchased through a market, q must be i
replaced with the marginal willingness to pay, which can obviously vary across households.
The above equations can be interpreted as the marginal social value (MSV) of a change
in each policy instrument, being positive/negative when the reform increases/decreases welfare.
Alternatively, these can be interpreted as optimality conditions where we set the MSV to zero
and solve for the optimal level of the relevant policy instrument. This simply highlights the fact
that it is sometimes useful to interpret optimal policy as a special case of the theory of policy
reform—the optimum is a situation from which no welfare-improving reform exists.  In the next
79
  See Coady and Harris (2000) for a more detailed discussion and an empirical example.
8
section, we use the above set of equations to provide a very useful framework for distributional
policy analysis.
3. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS
The preceding section set out the ingredients for the evaluation of policy reform in the
context of a simple general equilibrium model. This section focuses more specifically on the
distributional impact of these reforms and ignores completely the general equilibrium
consequences. This is not to say that these impacts are unimportant; on the contrary, they can
be quite significant when the economy is characterized by large “distortions” and may differ
substantially across instruments. Rather, the focus reflects that of much of the literature on the
distributive efficiency of alternative policy instruments, which is our main concern here. The
indirect effects identified above may be added onto the direct effects identified below to get the
total effect.
8
The direct distributional effect of the policy reforms (which by definition ignores the
indirect general equilibrium welfare effects) can be derived from the above equations either by
setting t = 0 (i.e., by essentially assuming they are zero since no “distortions” exist) or by
assuming no behavioral responses (i.e., price and income elasticities are zero). We can then








  In this simple model, i.e., ignoring the general equilibrium (or, equivalently, second-best) effects, at
9
the optimum 8s will also be equal to the same social marginal utility of income to households ($), which will be
constant across households, consistent with income distribution being optimal. In a second-best world, the
optimum will not in general be characterized by equal incomes or a constant $ (see Coady and Drèze 2000 for
more detailed discussion). 
(7)
transferring an extra unit of government revenue to households using each policy instrument
(Ahmad and Stern 1984, 1991; Skoufias and Coady 2000). For example, for a cash-transfer
program this is calculated as
where the denominator can be interpreted as the poverty-alleviation transfer budget. This is
essentially a benefit-cost ratio with the welfare-weighted sum of transfers across households
constituting the benefit and the unweighted sum of transfers (i.e., the transfer budget) as the
cost. A similar parameter can be derived for each policy instrument by replacing dm with x for i
tax instruments, by 0 0 for changes in the price of rationed commodities, and by (q - q ) for i                      i    is
changes in the prices of rationed commodities (summed over h ). At the optimum, the 8s across
*
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’ 8T % 8R ,
11
  By letting $  reflect the weights implicit in poverty evaluations (e.g., weights being zero above the
10       h
poverty line but positive and nondecreasing in income below), we get standard results in the poverty literature
(Besley and Kanbur 1988). Where the transfer takes the form of changing universal ration subsidies (or
equivalently universal income transfers), using the poverty gap measure we get the result that the marginal
social benefit (8) is a function of the headcount index (Besley and Kanbur 1988, 704–706). The greater the
proportion of the transfer budget received by poor households (or, equivalently, the greater the proportion of
the total ration quantities consumed by the poor) the higher is 8. The result is easily extended to the case where
the rations are geographically targeted. When we consider subsidies on market-purchased goods, the result
is “that the net effect depends on how large total consumption of a commodity is relative to its consumption
by the poor” (p. 708), which is another way of stating the budget allocation criterion as captured in 8.
(8)
separate 8, and these can then be compared across instruments. Social welfare can be
increased by switching from instruments with low 8s to those with high 8s.
10
For our purposes, it is useful to decompose 8 by both adding and subtracting the
average level of the transfer across all beneficiaries (i.e., across households with dm  > 0) to
h
get
where 8  is the targeting efficiency and 8  is the redistributive efficiency of the transfer T            R
instrument. So 8  captures the welfare impact, given those who are receiving transfers (i.e. the R
targeting rule), of deviating from uniform transfers. Alternatively, one can interpret 8  as the T
welfare impact of a program that transfers the poverty alleviation budget to the same beneficiary
households but in equal amounts, and 8  as the adjustment that needs to be made to allow for R
the differentiation of transfers across households in a more progressive (8 >0) or regressive R
(8 <0) manner. The sense in which 8  captures the redistributive efficiency of the policy R             R12
  Strictly speaking, 8  is a conditional redistributive index, since the program is assumed to be
11
R
financed  by a poll tax only on those receiving transfers. However, it is straightforward to construct  a
generalized or unconditional redistributive index by extending the poll tax across all households.
  See Lambert (1993, p. 164-7), Pfingsten (1986) and Besley and Preston (1988) for a more detailed
12
discussion of the concept of progression and the distributional “neutrality” of transfer mechanisms. For a
discussion on the analysis of the progressivity of tax schedules and the reform of these schedules see, for
example, Keen, Papapaanagos, and Shorrocks 2000.
instrument is made clearer by interpreting it as the welfare impact of a self-financing program
that transfers dm  to households and finances this by a lump-sum poll tax on all households with
h
dm  > 0 (i.e., all beneficiary households).
h            11
This decomposition of the welfare impact essentially defines progressivity (or
regressivity) with respect to a distributionally “neutral” uniform transfer. Alternatively, one could
define a neutral transfer program as one that is proportional with respect to household
incomes.  This perspective can also be easily accommodated within the above decomposition
12
by subtracting a proportional transfer from beneficiaries, as opposed to a uniform transfer, with
the factor of proportionality being determined both by the total incomes of beneficiary
households and the total budget. As before, 8  is still independent of the size of the budget. T
One way of interpreting these alternative decompositions is in terms of their informational
requirements. Given the budget and knowledge of which households receive transfers, the
uniform transfer requires only extra information on the number receiving transfers, while the
proportional requires additional information on incomes or at least the sum of incomes. Note
also that a uniform transfer financed by a proportional tax is progressive (8  > 0), but a R











neutrality with reference to deviations from a uniform transfer implicitly reflects a stronger
concern for redistribution. 
Below we will use this decomposition to interpret the more conventional leakage and
undercoverage measures of targeting efficiency within the above welfare theoretic framework.
We will also use this decomposition for an empirical analysis of the relative welfare impact of
alternative transfer instruments. For the sake of argument, consider some reference transfer
scheme, j, e.g., the status quo or some optimal scheme. Then the welfare impact of moving to
some alternative scheme, i, is
where the first term on the right-hand side captures the proportional change in welfare from
moving from the reference scheme to the new scheme due to their different degrees of targeting
efficiency, and the second term captures the proportional impact due to their different degrees
of redistributive efficiency. Notice that a policy instrument that is poorly targeted may still have






4. CONVENTIONAL ANALYSES OF TARGETING
This section describes the more conventional approaches to analyzing the targeting
effectiveness of transfer programs and interprets them within the standard welfare theoretic
framework set out above.
LEAKAGE AND UNDERCOVERAGE
It is common for analyses of the targeting efficiency of programs and policies to focus on
leakage (L) and undercoverage (U) rates, conventionally defined by Baker and Grosh (1994)
as
Leakage: The proportion of household reached by the program (i.e., are “in,” denoted
by i, as opposed to “out of,” denoted by o, the program) who are classified as nonpoor
(errors of inclusion), or
where N  is the number of nonpoor who are included in the program and N is np,i                          i





Undercoverage: The proportion of poor households not included in the program (errors
of exclusion), or
where N  is the number of poor households who are left out of the program and  p,o
N  is the total number of poor households. p
By construction we have N / N  + N  and N  = N  + N , where the total number i    np,i    p,i    o    p,o    np,o
of households is H = N  + N  = N + N . Using these identities it is easy to see that (1 - p    np    i    o
 L) = N /N and (1 - U) = N /N . These latter indicators will be useful later.  p,i  i            p,i  p
An obvious criticism of these indicators is that they focus only on who gets the transfers
and not on how much households get (i.e., the size of the transfer budget). Also, when
comparing across programs, it is often the case that those that score well on undercoverage
simultaneously score badly on leakage. For example, so-called universal programs would be
expected to score relatively well on undercoverage but badly on leakage, but this approach
does not address the issue of trade-off. Much of the problem lies in the fact that welfare weights
are not made explicit, although it is obvious that all the poor and all the nonpoor are treated





We can try to give a possible interpretation to U and L within the standard welfare
framework described above. Consider a program that has a budget of $1 for every poor
household and that distributes $1 to N households using an imperfect targeting rule. If everyone i
below the poverty line is given a welfare weight of unity and everyone above the poverty line a
welfare weight of zero, as is the case for the poverty gap indicator, then for this program we
have, using equation (7),
which can also be interpreted as the proportion of the total budget (i.e., of N by construction) i
that reaches poor households. This is just (1 - L), a sort of measure of “coverage,” so that L at
least has some basis in welfare theory, even if only capturing a certain dimension of such
programs. But it also equals (1 - U)N /N, so that some adjusted version of U also has a p  i
welfare interpretation. However, since N (and thus N /N) can vary across programs, each in i      p  i
general needs to be adjusted differently. Note also that when N  = N, U and L coincide—this p    i
holds when the receipt of some income by a nonpoor household precludes the receipt of any
income by a poor household, i.e., either the money goes to a poor or to a nonpoor household.
It will apply, for example, when the number of (not necessarily poor) households given transfers
is determined by the number of poor households. 17
  If all of the transfer to poor households contributed to reducing the poverty gap, then (1 - L) equals
13
the percentage reduction in the poverty gap. However, in practice, transfers to some poor households may be
more than sufficient to bring the household up to the poverty line, so that (1 - L) is an upper bound on the
latter. The difference essentially arises from the fact that whereas our “marginal” analysis of transfers assumes
welfare weights are fixed, the leakage measures encompass a discrete welfare weighting scheme whereby the
weight attached to a poor household goes from 1 to zero on crossing the poverty line. See also the discussion
in Atkinson (1995, 30) of the concept of “horizontal efficiency” used by Weisbrod (1970). To get from 8 to the
poverty gap measure, just insert, in equation (8), dm  = (z -y ) for those brought over the poverty line, z.
h      h
  Note that there appears to be a discrepancy in Table 1 of Wodon (1997, 2084) and its note regarding
14
definitions. We use SP and SE definitions, which both reflect successes.
To summarize, (1-L) is a valid measure of the welfare impact only for programs that
transfer equal amounts to beneficiaries and only for a particular set of welfare weights (those
consistent with the poverty gap indicator).  Using equation (8), it is clear that such a measure
13
captures only the targeting efficiency (8 ) of the program and ignores its redistributive efficiency T
(8 ). R
ROC CURVES
The welfare basis of the related concept of “relative operating characteristics” (ROC)
curves can also be addressed using the above formula (Wodon 1997). This approach to
poverty analysis uses the concepts of “sensitivity” (SE) and “specificity” (SP) defined as
follows:
Sensitivity: The proportion of poor households who receive benefits (are “in”).
Specificity: The proportion of nonpoor households not in the program.























Again, since, in general, N can differ across programs, both SE and SP need to be adjusted i
before they can be used for welfare comparisons across programs that transfer equal amounts
to beneficiaries. With regard to ROC analysis where, for a given poverty line, one chooses the
program (or instrument) that minimizes some weighted average of SE and SP (with, say, a and
b as weights, respectively), it should be clear that these weights should be such that the
program chosen should also maximize 8. It is straightforward to show that for this to hold it
must be that a = " + b(n/p), where a and b are the weights on SE and SP, respectively, " is
the number of poor households divided by the total number of households receiving transfers, n
is the proportion of nonpoor who receive, and p the proportion of poor who receive.
E- AND F-MISTAKES
Others in the literature refer to E- and F-mistakes (Cornia and Stewart 1995). F-









’ 1 & 8 ,
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either the total number of nonpoor or the total population as the numerator. However, here we
wish to focus on the definition of E-mistakes as
where v is the average transfer received by all nonpoor households and S is the total budget. It
is this easy to see that, for programs transferring equal amounts to beneficiaries, this just equals
where the numerator is summed over all nonpoor and the denominator is summed over all
households (i.e., poor and nonpoor). As Cornia and Stewart (1995, 353) recognized, “where
the subsidy consists of a given sum, equal for each recipient…, this ratio is equivalent to the
ratio of N /N” (our notation). From our perspective, choosing the program with the lowest np,i  i
E-mistakes is equivalent to choosing that with the highest 8, so the former is also the correct
welfare measure, but again only for welfare weights consistent with the poverty gap measure. 
5. ILLUSTRATION OF THE DECOMPOSITION USING DATA FROM MEXICO20
This section shows how the decomposition presented above can be used to evaluate the
relative targeting and redistributive efficiencies of alternative policy instruments.
For the purposes of illustration, we focus on the recent shift in Mexico’s poverty alleviation
strategy toward better-targeted transfer schemes. The point of departure is one where universal
food (i.e., cereals) subsidies constitute the main plank of the poverty alleviation strategy.
However, these are perceived as being poorly targeted with much leakage of benefits to
nonpoor households. 
One can then consider a number of alternative targeting strategies. Here we consider two
broad approaches: demographic and poverty targeting. Demographic targeting involves giving
transfers only to households with children, similar to child benefit in many developed countries.
Poverty targeting involves giving transfers only to households classified as poor according to
some—usually welfare-based—criterion. The actual program implemented in Mexico is a
combination of these two approaches, with an element of geographic targeting also involved.
The targeted programs considered here are:
(i) Demographic transfers: where cash transfers are given to all households with
children according to the structure set out in Table 1. Four alternatives are considered,
namely, transfers to those children ages 0–4 years, transfers to those ages 5–10 years,21
  See Case and Deaton (1998) for an example of a cash transfer (pension) scheme targeted at older age
15
groups in South Africa, which they find to be a good targeting mechanism given the high dependency ratios
in these households.
transfers to those ages 0–10 years, transfers to those ages 5–19 years, or transfers given
to those ages 0–19 years.
15
(ii) Poverty transfers: where cash transfers, set at a uniform rate, are given to poor
households. Also considered are a geographically targeted version where a uniform
transfer is given to all households located in poor municipalities. Such uniform transfers
can also be interpreted as capturing the welfare impacts arising from changes either in the
levels of infra-marginal subsidized consumer rations or changes in the subsidy levels.
The actual program implemented was a combination of both (i) and (ii), since
demographic transfers were given to poor households. This combined program is used to
Table 1—Structure of demographic transfers (pesos per month)
 Child’s age (years)  Male  Female
 0-4   37.5   37.5
 5-10  37.5   37.5
 11-14   87.5   92.5
 15-19  97.5   112.5
Notes: The program with cash transfers to 0–4-year-olds is denoted by “DemoC,” to 5–10-year-olds by
“DemoP,” to 5–19-year-olds by “DemoPS,” and to 0–19-year-olds by “DemoAll.” When poverty
targeting is combined with demographic targeting, programs are denoted by placing a “P” in front,
e.g., “PDemoP” for a demographic program targeted at 5–10-year-olds. The “PDemoPS” program is
used to determine the budget, which is then held fixed across all programs, e.g., by scaling the
benefits structure up or down as appropriate. 22
  Note that this study does not address the issue of imperfect targeting information, i.e., where an
16
imperfect indicator of income might have to be chosen. For an analysis that suggests that the welfare losses
from having to choose income over preferred consumption are minimal, see Skoufias and Coady (2000).
  For the final municipality included, transfers are given to the poorest households until 30 percent of
17
all households are included.
determine the budget. Households are classified as poor if they fall into the bottom 30 percent
of the distribution of consumption per adult equivalent (henceforth denoted as income, y).
16
With geographic targeting, the uniform transfer is given to the poorest municipalities until 30
percent of households are included.  Also considered is an alternative where the transfer
17
amount is doubled and concentrated only on extremely poor municipalities. Table 2 defines the
program acronyms used in the figures.
The data source is the Mexican household survey for 1996. Mean income is $455 per
month and the poverty line is $200. The average poverty gap is 55 percent of the total
Table 2—Definition of program acronyms
Programs Definition
Food Subsidies Universal food subsidies on cereals
DemoC Transfers to children ages 0–4 years in all households
DemoCP Transfers to children ages 0–10 years in all households
DemoALL Transfers to children ages 0–19 years in all households
DemoPS Transfers to children age 5–19 years in all households
DemoP Transfers to children ages 5–10 years in all households
GeogM Uniform transfer to households in poor localities
Geog2M Double GeogM transfers to poorest half of poor localities
Uniform Uniform transfers to all poor households
PdemoC Transfers to children ages 0–4 years in poor households
PdemoPS Transfers to children ages 5–19 years in poor households
PdemoALL Transfers to children ages 0–19 years in poor households
PdemoCP Transfers to children ages 0–10 years in poor households







income of all poor households, i.e., the average incomes would have to be increased to
eliminate poverty, and even then this would have to be distributed optimally (i.e., no leakage to
the nonpoor and transfers being just sufficient to bring the household to the poverty line). The
budget comes out at 47 percent of the poverty gap.
To calculate the various 8s, one needs to specify a set of welfare weights, $ . The
h
conventional approach is to calculate these as
where k is a reference household (e.g., the household on the poverty line) and , > 0 is a
parameter that captures our aversion to income inequality. The higher this parameter, the
greater the relative weight attached to the income of poorer households. For example, for , = 1
if y  = 2y , then $  = 2$ . For , = 5, our set of welfare weights puts most of the emphasis on
k    h     h    k
income going to the poorest of the poor. In our empirical illustration, we concentrate on results
for , = 2, but also present results for , = 5 for comparison.
The 8s for the alternative programs are presented in Figure 1a and Figure 1b for , = 2
and , = 5, respectively. All alternative programs perform substantially better than food
subsidies. There is a clear pattern across targeting alternatives. Demographically targeted
programs are dominated by poverty-targeted programs (including geographic targeting), which














































The magnitude of the welfare gain in moving from food subsidies to demographically targeted
programs is similar to the gain in moving from these latter programs to the combination of
poverty and demographic targeting.
Figures 2a and 2b present the proportional welfare gains in moving from food subsidies,
and decomposes this gain into that due to improved targeting efficiency and that due to
improved redistributive efficiency using equation (9). The contrast between demographic and
poverty targeting is clear. As expected, most of the welfare gain from demographic targeting is
due to improved redistributive efficiency, whereas most of the welfare gain from poverty
targeting is due to improved targeting efficiency. Thus, there is a very high return from improving
targeting efficiency, i.e., the additional redistributive gains from combining poverty with
demographic targeting are relatively small. Similar results follow when we use proportional—as
opposed to uniform—transfers as our reference for neutrality (Figure 3a, 3b).
In summary, then, the important gains achieved by moving away from universal food
subsidies to the combined demographic- and poverty-targeted program implemented in Mexico
arise mainly from the greater targeting (as opposed to redistributive) efficiency of the approach.
The returns to efforts devoted to identifying which households are most deserving (i.e., the





































































































6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper sets out a simple general equilibrium model for the welfare evaluation of
alternative poverty-alleviation programs or policy instruments. The total welfare impact of a
program is derived as the sum of the direct impact on welfare plus an indirect welfare impact
that arises from the need to restore equilibrium to product and factor markets as well as to
public finances. Focusing on the direct welfare impact, we decompose the welfare impact of
programs into their targeting and redistributive efficiencies. Using this decomposition, we are
able to give a welfare interpretation to the more conventional measures of program
effectiveness, namely leakage and undercoverage. We show that such measures ignore the
relative redistributive efficiencies of programs and, even then, are a valid index of their relative
targeting efficiencies only for a set of welfare weights consistent with the poverty-gap measure.
Using, as an illustration, the recent policy switch in Mexico toward a more targeted poverty-
alleviation program, we show that the biggest welfare gain in moving away from universal
subsidies is due to improved targeting, as opposed to redistributive, efficiency. 29
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